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ment of attorney's fees because it was acting in good faith 
in refusing to release the mortgage. But we need not decide 
whether "good faith" in refusing to release is a de-
fense in an action brought under Sec. 78-3-8 R. S. 12 
U. 1933. The evidence in the record indicates that 
appellant refused to advance money under the contract in an 
attempt to force payment on another contract. And ap-
pellant offered to release the mortgage only if reimbursed 
for its expenditures although by its own act it had breached 
the contract and made it impossible for respondent to pro-
ceed. Appellant failed to establish that it acted in "good 
faith" in refusing to release the mortgage. 
A party who contracts to lend money to another to build 
a house, taking a mortgage thereon as security, observes 
the other party expend money and time and perform as 
agreed, yet refuses for reasons of coercion connected with 
another matter to advance money as agreed, can 
hardly insist that he acted in entire good faith and 13 
should therefore be protected from payment of certain 
damages. 
Judgment affirmed. Costs to respondents. 
MOFFAT, C. J., and LARSON, McDONOUGH, and 
PRATT, JJ. concur. 
SHIELDS v. UTAH LIGHT ft TRACTION CO. 
No. 6157. Decide September 18. 1940. (105 P. 2d Ml.) 
1. APPEAL AND ERKOR. TRIAL. In death action, the reading of a 
long and involved complaint to jury as part of the charge consti-
tuted prejudicial error which waa not altogether corrected by in-
struction that the complaint was not to be construed as evidence 
but merely aa Betting forth claims of plaintiff. Rev, St 1933, §§ 
67-7-10, 57-7-28(2, 3), 67-7-29, 67-7-81, 104-14-7, 104-39-3. 
SL APPEAL AND ERBOE. THIAL. In death action where deceased at 
time of death was earning $77.60 per month, instruction setting 
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forth plaintiffs theory that deceased would have soon been earn-
ing $200 per month constituted prejudicial error where no evi-
dence was offered to support such allegation. Rev. St. 1933, §§ 
104-14-7, 104-39-3.1 
8. AITKAJL AND ERROR. In death action arising out of intersection 
collision, an instruction setting forth in full applicable city or-
dinances and state statutes constituted prejudicial error, where 
trial court failed to caution jury that such laws merely #et forth 
plaintiff's claim, and where plaintiffs complaint contained the 
only verbatim copy of any law, and in a subsequent instruction 
jury were directed to look elsewhere in the instructions for certain 
laws relating to motor vehicle traffic. Rev. St. 1933, §§ 104-14-7, 
104-39-3.2 
4. DEATH. In death action, evidence of remarriage of plaintiff, sur-
viving mother of deceased, at a time subsequent to accident but 
before tibial, was not admissible on damage issue, but jury was 
entitled to consider on such issue physical and mental condition 
of beneficiaries of deceased at time of his death. Rev. St. 1933, §§ 
104-3-11, 104-41 3.* 
WOLFE, J., dissenting in part. 
Appeal from District Court, Third District, Salt Lake 
County; Roger L McDonough, Judge. 
Action by Millie Shields against the Utah Light & Trac-
tion Company, a corporation, to recover for death of 
plaintiff's son in a traffic accident. From a judgment for 
the plaintiff, the defendant appeals and plaintiff filed 
a cross-appeal. 
Reversed, and new trial granted. 
Hougaard, Shields & Shields, of Salt Lake City, fa? 
appellant. 
*Smith v. Columbus Bu#gy Co., 40 Utah 580, 123 P. 680; SUA* 
Bank of Beaver v. Hollingshead, 82 Utah 416, 25 P. 2d 612. 
*Loofborrow v. Utah Light & Railway Co., 31 Utah 355, 88 P. 19; 
Povit V. Heiner, 54 Utah 428, 181 P. 587. 
^English v. Southern Poo. Co., 13 Utah 407, 45 P. 47, 35 L. E. K 
155, 57 Am. St. Rep. 772; Evan$ V. Oregon S. L. R. Co., 37 Utah 431, 
108 P. 638, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 259; Fritz v. Western Union Tel <>•, 
25 Utah 263, 71 P. 209. 
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Bagley, Jtidd, Ray & Nebeker, of Salt Lake City, for 
respondent. 
JONES, District Judge. 
This is an appeal from a money judgment in a damage 
action resulting from a traffic accident which caused death. 
The accident took place on one of the main thorough-
fares of Salt Lake City. The hour was 6:30 a. m., the 
weather fair, the streets dry, and only the two vehicles 
which collided were in the vicinity. The deceased was trav-
eling west on his motorcycle at about 30 or 35 miles per 
hour. The bus was moving eastward at approximately 15 
miles per hour. Both vehicles approached a semaphore con-
trolled intersection showing "go" at about the same moment. 
The collision took place over on the north half of the street 
while the bus was executing a left turn. Respondent's 
theory was that the bus was cutting the corner, did not 
have the right of way, no signal was given, it was going too 
fast, and was not being operated under proper control. 
Appellant disputed these contentions and alleged that the 
deceased was guilty of contributory negligence. 
In instructing the jury the trial court included therein 
substantial copies of the pleadings of the parties. Instruc-
tion number one which set forth the allegations of the com-
plaint occupies more than ten printed pages of the abstract. 
Sub-paragraphs four and five of this instruction (being the 
identical portions of the complaint) read as follows: 
"(4) That at all times herein mentioned there were in full force 
•md effect in Salt lake City, Utah, certain ordinance*, as fallows, 
to wit: 
"Sec 1872. Vehicle Turning Left lit Intersection, (c) The driver 
of a vehicle within an intersection intending: to turn to the left shall 
yield to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction, which 
is within the intersection, or BO clow thereto, as to constitute an im-
mediate hazard, but j&aid driver having to yielded and having given a 
signal when and as required by law, may make such left turn, and 
other vehicle* approaching the intersection from said opposite direc-
tion shall yield to the driver making the left torn. 
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"Sac 1374 (as amended May 3, 1936). 
"(2) A signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given con-
tinuously during not less than the last one hundred feet traveled by 
the vehicle before turning. 
"(5A) Left hand turn arm extended horizontally. 
"Sec 1370. The driver of a vehicle intending to make a left turn 
ahall turn as near as possible to the right of the center of the street 
upon which he is proceeding where the same crosses the crosswalk and 
into the intersection, and to proceed so as to enter the street into 
'which he is turning as nearly as possible to the right of the center of 
the same where it passes the crosswalk and enters the intersection. 
41
 (6) That at all times mentioned in said complaint there was like-
wise in full force and effect Revised Statutes of Utah 1933r which con-
tained the following sections, to wit: 
"Eight Of Way 57-7-31. At Intersections. • • • 
"The driver of a vehicle within an intersection intending to turn to 
the loft *hall yield to any vehicle approaching from the opposite di-
rection which is within the intersection or so close thereto as to con-
stitute an immediate hazard, but such driver having so yielded and 
karing given a signal when and as required by law may make such 
left turn, and other vehicles approaching the intersection from tha 
opposite direction shall yield to the driver making the left turn. 
"57-7-28. Turning at Intersections. * • • 
"(2) Approach for a left turn shall he made in the lane for traffic 
to the right of and nearest to the center line of the highway, and 3eft 
turn shall be made by passing to the right of such center line wbars 
it enters the intersection and upon leaving the intersection by pass-
ing to the right of the center line of the highway then entered. 
U(S) Approach for a left turn from a two-way street into a cna-
r^&y street shall be made in the lane for traffic to the right of a&d 
nearest to the center line of the highway and by passing to the rigfol 
$f such center line where it enters the intersection. 
"57-7-29. Departure from Direct Line of Travel—Signals. 
"The driver of any vehicle upon a highway before starting, stopping 
or tunning from & direct line ahall first see that nuch movement &M 
be rr^de in safety, and, if any pedestrian may be affected by sut& 
movement, shall give a clearly audible signal by Bounding the hoTO 
and whenever the operation of any other vehicle may be affected bj 
1MQ] SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 311 
Appeal from Third District 
such movement shall give a signal aa required in this section plainly 
visible to the driver of such other vehicle of the intention to make 
such movement. 
"The signal herein required shall be given either by means of the 
hand and arm in the manner herein specified, or by an approved 
mechanical or electrical signal device, except that when a vehicle is 
so constructed or loaded as to prevent the hand and arm signal from 
being visible both to the front and rear the signal shall be given by a 
device of a tyj>e which has been approved by the state road commission. 
<fWhenever the signal is given by meanB of the hand and arm the 
driver Bhall indicate his intention to start, stop or turn by extending 
the hand and arm horizontally from and beyond the left side of the 
vehicle," (Thia section was amended by chap. 48, Session LAWS 1935.) 
Instruction number four is as follows: 
"The foregoing instructions are not to be considered by the jury as 
a statement on the part of the court of the facts as proved in this 
case, but simply as a recital of what the plaintiff and defendant re-
spectively claim to be the facts. Where it is stated that a party ad-
mits certain facts, you are to take such facts as established and 
proved, beyond this you are not to draw any conclusions as to the 
facts from a mere recital of the claims of the respective parties as 
hereinbefore set forth. It is aolely and exclusively for the jury to 
find and determine the facta, and this they must do from the evi-
dence, and having done so the jury must then apply to the facts the law 
as set out in these instructions,** 
The first paragraphs of instructions numbered ten, 
eleven and twelve are as follows (the last paragraphs of 
these instructions make specific applications of the proposi-
tions set forth fa the first paragraphs) ; 
"Number 10. You are instructed that it Is provided by the laws of 
the State of Utah that the driver of a vehicle within an intersection in-
tending to turn to the left shall yield to any vehicle approaching 
from the opposite direction which is within the intersection, or so 
close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard. 
"Number 11. You are instructed that it i% provided by tha laws at 
the State of Utah that no person shall turn a vehicle from a direct 
course upon a highway unless and until such movement can be made 
with reasonable safety and then only after giving an appropriate elg^ 
tial, and that a signal of the intention to turn to the left shall b* giv«n 
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continuously during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the 
Tfchkle before turning; that when a left hand turn is about to be 
made the signal sh#]l be given by the hand and arm extended hori-
*oot»lly or by a signal lamp or signal device of a type approved by 
the state road commission, but when a vehicle is so constructed or 
loaded that a hand and arm signal would not be visible both to the 
front and rear of such vehicle then said signal must be given by such 
lamp or device. 
"Number 12. You are instructed that it is provided by the laws of 
the State of Utah that the driver of a vehicle intending to turn at 
an intersection shall do as follows: Approach for a left turn shall be 
made in the lane of traffic to the right of and nearest to the center 
line of the highway, and the left turn shall be made by passing to 
the right of such center line where it enters the intersection, and on 
leaving the intersection by passing to the right of the center line of 
the highway then entered." 
From the foregoing is will be observed that while the 
court cautioned the jury that "the foregoing instructions 
[referring to the pleadings] are not to be considered by the 
jury as a statement on the part of the court of the facte 
&s proved in this case, but simply as a recital of what tho 
plaintiff and defendant respectively claim to be the facts/? 
j%t in1 a following instruction the attention of the jury i& 
Specifically directed back to the only quoted copy of certain 
statutes and ordinances which appears in instruction one, 
ijx the following language: 
\ ""Elsewhere in these instructions certain laws relative to motor v&* 
hide traffic are s*t Jorth" e t c 
From this point of view the jury is told that the fo$U 
going "merely set forth the claims of the parties as to tha^ 
fm&Bn but that this same instruction contains the la^£ 
Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the plaintiff b^ 
copying into her complaint certain sections of our statute 
(with the hope, no doubt, that the trial judge would include 
the same in the instructions relating to the pleadings) has 
keen able to secure, in effect, an emphasis upon certalit 
propositions of law as against others which are entitle? 
to equal .weight On this theory respondent caused portions 
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of the city ordinances to be read to the jury as well as 
certain identical sections of the statute in addition to having 
the court (further on in the instructions) repeat these laws 
in substance together with an explanation of just how 
these propositions were to be applied to the facts. The 
reiteration of given propositions to the jury in the instruc-
tions does not have judicial approval: 1 Blashfield on 
Instructions to Juries, § 108; 2 Bancrofts Code Practice, 
1145; Randall's Instructions to Juries, § 416; Alaska Steam-
ship Co. v. Pacific Coast Gypsum Co., 78 Wash. 247, 138 P. 
875; Schroeder v. Lodge, 92 Neb. 650 139 N. W. 221, Ann. 
Cas. 1914B, 1173; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. V. 
Alexander, 47 Wash. 131, 91 P. 626; Kahl v. Chicago, Mil-
waukee & St. Paid Ry. Co., 125 111. App. 294; Munsey v. 
Marnet Oil & Gas Co., Tex. Civ. App., 199 S. W. 686, 687. 
There is one other matter in connection with the reading 
of the pleadings to the jury as part of the instructions 
which might be mentioned here. In sub-paragraph 9 of 
instruction one the jury is advised (by way of setting forth 
just what plaintiff contended' the facts showed) that at 
the time of the death of the deceased (as a result of the 
accident in question) he was an "employee of the Tooele 
Valley Railway Company in Salt Lake City, Utah, and was 
earning a salary of $77.50 a month, and was promised by 
said employer, and upon such promise it is therefore al-
leged that his salary would rapidlyincrease until he would 
be earning approximately $200.00 per month/' Appellant 
makes the point that there is no testimony in the record to 
sustain the last phrase of the &boVe quotation. Respondent 
concedes that there is no testimony as to the exact amount 
of the possible raise in salary but points to the statement 
of one of the officers of the Tooele Valley Railway Company 
to the effect that the deceased's opportunity for advance-
ment in pay and position was "very good/' This being true 
the trial court should have deleted the reference to the 
$200 item from the instruction, for, in setting forth the 
claims of the parties to the jury, only that portion of the 
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pleadings on which evidence had been introduced, should 
be mentioned at all, although the reading of the pleadings 
to the jury is generally condemned. Randall's Instructions 
to Juries, § 404; Hammer v. Liberty Baking Company, 220 
Iowa 229, 260 N. W. 720; In re Thompson's Estate, 211 
Iowa, 935, 234 N. W. 841; WeUon V. Iowa State Highway 
Commission 211 Iowa 625, 233 N. W. 876, 877; Smith V. 
Columbus Buggy Co., 40 Utah 580, 123 P. 580. 
Respondent tacitly admits that a verbatim reading of the 
pleadings to the jury as a part of the instructions is not 
the best procedure but insists that prejudicial error has 
not been committed when one considers the entire charge 
of the trial court together with Sections 104-14-7, 104-39-3, 
R. S. U. 1933, as construed by this court in Loofborrow v. 
Utah Light & Railway Co., 81 Utah 355, 88 P. 19; and in 
Davis V. Heiner, 54 Utah 428, 181 P. 587. Quotations from 
the separate opinions of Justices Gideon and Thurman 
appear in the briefs as to just what the holding of this 
;ourt was in the latter case. Under such circumstances the 
lecision of the court should be ascertainable by reading the 
jylabus. See Sec 26, Article VIII, Constitution of Utah. 
Applicable point determined by the headnotes of this case 
•ead as follows: 
"2. Appeal and Error—Harmless Error—Statute. Under direct 
nrovisions of Comp. Laws 1917, §§ $622 and 6968, Supreme Court will 
tot reverse judgment except for prejudicial error." (The above are 
tow identified as sections 104-14-7, and 104-89-8, R. S. U. 1988 r*-
pectlvely). 
"$. Trial—Instruction.*—Sufficiency. ) Trial court should concisely 
fcate issues to jury, and not merely read the pleading* verbatim. 
i i 
"7. Appeal and Error—Harmless Error—Instructions. Trial court'* 
rror in simply reading pleading* to jury, and not concisely stating 
&ues in his own language, held not prejudicial, where issues were 
imple, and substantially all allegations in both complaint and an-
grer were controverted." 
The issues in thi3 case were not Bimple in any reaped 
ppellant was charged with having caused the death of 
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the motorcyclist in several particulars as heretofore out-
lined. Appellant denied responsibility for the accident and 
set up by way of contributory negligence that the deceased 
did not have his motorcycle under control, did not maintain 
proper lookout, and crossed into said intersection at a speed, 
which was not reduced, of S6 miles per hour. 
The jury was twice informed (instruction one, paragraph 
four and Instruction eleven) that a driver intending to turn 
left at a semaphore controlled intersection must give the 
signal for such turn continuously during not less than the 
last one hundred feet traveled by the vehicle before com-
mencing to turn. (For the purpose of the retrial this refer-
ence to this subject should not be construed as an approval 
of the instruction as correctly stating the law). Three times 
was the jury reminded that at a semaphore controlled inter-
section a driver intending to turn to the left shall yield to 
any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which 
is within the intersection, or so close thereto as to consti-
tute an immediate hazzard. (See Instruction one, subpar-
agraph four' and five and Instruction ten.) Aside from the 
subject of undue emphasis these instructions may not cor-
rectly set forth the law. (See Sec 67-7-10 R. S. U. 1933, 
Chap. 48 p. 117, Session Laws 1935.) Two limes was the 
jury's attention directed to the law on just where and 
when a left turn on a highway should be executed, (See 
Instruction one subparagraph five and Instruction twelve.) 
We conclude that the reading of the long and involved 
complaint to the jury as part of the charge was error not 
altogether corrected by the mere admonition that the fore-
going is not to be construed as evidence but merely sete 
forth the claims of the plaintiff, likewise, the setting 
forth of plaintiff's theory in Instruction one, that the 1-8 
deceased would have soon been earning ?200 per 
month was error for the reason that there was no evidence 
offered to support such allegation. See State Bank of Beaver 
V. HoUingshead, 82 Utah 416, 25 P- 2d 612. The setting 
forth in haec verba of applicable city ordinances and state 
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statutes in the Instruction relating to the pleadings was 
error especially when it is considered that not only did the 
trial court fail to caution the jury that such laws merely 
®et forth plaintiff's claim but in a subsequent instruction 
the jury were directed to look elsewhere "in these instruc-
tions for certain laws relating to motor vehicle traffic" 
When plaintiff's complaint contained the only verbatim 
copy of any law in the entire charge. And the resulting 
emphasis on applicable laws favorable to plaintiff's side 
as the result of the continual reference and repeating of 
certain law propositions resulted in the unbalancing of 
the charge and error. 
So, weighing and considering these several errors to-
gether in the light of our statute (Sees. 104-14-7 and 104-
89*8 R. S. U. 1933), the conclusion must be reached that 
appellant's substantial rights were in fact affected and 
prejudiced in a material manner. 
Having determined that the action must be retried, it 
now becomes necessary to discuss certain other law ques^ 
tfcns which will arise on the new trial. (Sec. 104-41-8 R. 
S. V. 1933.) 
%1 f^tke parties differ as to whether the remarriage of t$<? 
plaintiff, the surviving mother of the deceased, at a tim$ 
Subsequent to the accident but before the trial should be 
permitted to go before the jury as bearing upon the damag^ 
issue. Appellant maintains that such evidence should 
^•permitted to go before the jury while respondent 
fiimsts that the t'emarriage is immaterial because the 
damages should be measured as of the moment of death" 
5*here is a conflict among the authorities on this proposi-
tion. The rule generally followed is that the pecuniary \o&$ 
ho the beneficiaries is to be based upon conditions as thej 
existed at the time of the death complained of. See note &1 
80 A. L. R. 121; Simoneau V. Pacific Electric R. Co., 16? 
CaL 264, 136 P. 644, 49 L. R. A., N. S., 737; Davis V. Guafr 
fcfen, 46 Ohio St. 470, 15 N. E. 850, 4 Am. St. Rep. 54g 
Swift & Co. v. Foster, 183 111. 60, 44 N. E. 837; St. Louk 
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J. M. & S. if. Co., v. Cleere, 76 Ark. 377, 88 S. W. 995; Cor^ 
solidated Stone Co. v. Morgan, 160 Ind. 241, 68 N. E. 696; 
Boswell V. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 23 S. E. 414; Beaumont 
Traction Co. v. Dilworth, Tex. Civ, App., 94 S. W. 352. 
The minority rule holds that evidence is admissible cov-
ering a change for the better In the financial status of the 
beneficiary subsequent to the time of death. Francis V. At-
chinon, T. & S. F. R. Co., 113 Tex. 202, 253 S. W. 819, 30 
A. L. R. 114, 119; Davis V. Wight, Tex. Civ. App. 218 S. W. 
26. 
In Francis V. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., supra, it was 
held, upon the question of the amount of damages to be 
awarded parents for the wrongful death of an adult son, 
that evidence was admissible showing subsequent to death, 
said parents had become the recipients of an income through 
a policy on insurance on the life of another son. Such a 
holding in and of itself points out the salient weakness of 
this rule for, if evidence of a change in the financial con-
dition of a beneficiary for the better occurring subsequent 
to death but before trial is admissible, reason would require 
that likewise evidence of the bidden poverty or misfortune 
of the statutory party after the time of death and before 
the trial should be received. So, ultimately and finally 
the question becomes as to whether in this jurisdiction the 
damage should be measured as of the moment of death or, 
for all practical purposes, the day of the trial. We feel that 
the! fairest w&y'tb ascertain "sucll'damages * * * as under 
all the circumstances of the case may be just*' (Sec. 104-
8-11 R. S. U. 1933) is to limit the inquiry on this issue to 
the moment of death. In so holding 'we do not in any Way 
change the previous determination of this court to the 
effect that the physical and mental condition of the bene-
ficiaries in an action for wrongful death should be con-
sidered by the jury in estimating the damages including 
particularly the age, health, and other similar circumstances 
(Evans V. Oregon S. L. R. Co., 37 Utah 431,108 P. 638, Ann. 
Cas. 1912C, 259; English V. Southern Pac. Co., 13 Utah 407, 
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45 P. 47, 85 L. R. A. 155, 57 Ann. St Rep., 772) except td 
now announce that such evidence should relate to the time of 
death. 
The age and probable length of life of the deceased as of 
the moment of death is a relevant fact to be considered 
in estimating the amount of pecuniary loss caused by the 
death to the beneficiary to the action. See L. R. A. 1918E, 
280 and other cases therein cited; 26 A. L. R. 595 and 
cases therein cited; 7 A. L, R. 1341 and cases therein cited; 
and see English V Southern Pac. Co., supra. The disposition 
of the deceased toward aiding or supporting the beneficiary 
during his lifetime may be shown. And in connection with 
this disposition the affection or the absence thereof and the 
aid actually given may be shown. See Evans v. Oregon 
S. L. R. Co., supra. And should it be made to appear that 
the disposition of the deceased was such that he would 
reasonably have continued to render services and help his 
mother after obtaining his majority then damages may ba 
claimed for such prospective help that the deceased might 
have been given during the life of the beneficiary even though 
during that period he might be under no legal obligatio^ 
to so help. Bond V. United R. Co.f 159 Cal. 270, 113 P. 36$, 
48 L. R. A., N. S., 687, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 60; State v. Cohe^ 
166 Md. 682,172 A. 274, 94 A. L. R. 247; Stejskal v. Darrovf^ 
55 N. D. 606, 215 N. W. 83, 53 A. L. R. 1096; Franklin t 
South Eastern Ry., 3 Hurl. & Nor. 211, 157 Eng. Rep. 44^ 
6 Eng. Rul. Cas. 419, and see annotation in 53 A. L. ^ 
1102, 1103. 
<> In concluding this discussion it should be remarked tfeM 
the mere fact that the deceased was single and might m 
some time marry is too remote to be given consideration 
as a separate issue. Fritz v. Western Union Tel. Co., 25 Utai 
263, 71 P. 209, send see L. # . A. 1918E, 282. This being thi 
correct rule, it would likewise be improper to receive evj; 
donee bearing on the mere possibility of the remar^"^3*1 
the surviving beneficiary. See 30 A. L. R. 124. 
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There is one other matter. This appeal and the trial 
below waa had with the respondent appearing by her former 
name. Prior to the next trial she should ask leave to sub-
stitute her present legal surname (Tate) for the former 
one used at the time the complaint was filed (Shields). 
Should the plaintiff seasonably neglect to take this step 
the defendant is to have the privilege of forcing this change 
by motion for, when a woman marries, the law confers on 
her the surname of the husband. Brown V. Rdnke, 159 
Minn. 458, 199 N. W. 235, 35 A. L. R. 413, and see annota-
tion at 35 A. L. R. 417. 
The action is accordingly reversed and a new trial 
granted. Costs to appellant 
MOFFAT, Chief Justice. 
I concur in the result 
LARSON, Justice. I concur. 
PRATT, Justice. 
I concur in the result 
WOLFE, Justice (concurring in part, dissenting in part) • 
[4] The measure of the damages is the loss of the prob-
able contributions which deceased might have made toward 
support of respondent had he lived. This is to be measured 
as of the time the cause of action arose—at the time of the 
death due to negligence. But the difficult question is 
whether, in determining the probability of contributions 
as of that time, subsequent events which occurred up to 
the time of trial and which may throw light on that prob-
ability may be introduced. I think not If the measure of 
damage is the loss of contributions commuted as of the time 
of death, we must consider the matter as if the jury had 
tfied the case as of the time of death. The argument that 
any evidence of events occurring between the death and 
the trial which would tend to reduce th$ speculative element 
in the probability factor should be admitted is alluring 
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but specious. The doer of the negligence should not benefit 
by another's windfall nor respond because of another's' 
misfortunes unconnected with his negligence. While th# 
judgment is to compensate for a loss and not to penalize 
for carelessness, the very principle that the defendant should 
not benefit because of good fortune, fortuitous so far &s"« 
it is concerned, nor be mulcted because of misfortune not* 
related to its acts, requires that as of the time of the death1 
we measure the then commuted value of the loss of probable* 
contributions. This rule is born of its practicality. Other-
wise a widow might owe the defendant money if it caused 
the death of a poor and undesirable husband thus giving 
her the enviable opportunity of consummating marriage 
with a rich and more desirable spouse. And where the 
death resulted in payment to the plaintiff of life Insurance 
money which she otherwise would not have obtained, coiiid 
the doer of the negligence argue that the death had actually 
befcfcfite<l b&r more th&n &ny living c&ntrib\itk>tt v*\nt,h sh% 
might expect? Appellant cannot claim the result of a 
benefit which may have ensued from its own wrong not 
can it any the more take advantage of a betterment whidl 
came about subsequent to but not consequent on the deaftl* 
it caused. The loss becomes fixed at the time of deaiS^ 
for at that time the probable contributor was removed. •$ 
therefore, concur in the conclusion that the probable valp$ 
of the loss of contributions commuted as of the time <$? 
death does not permit evidence of good or bad fortune #|§ 
"flowing proximately from defendant's negligence to./^£| 
Introduced in order to throw light on the probability QI 
contributions. The probability is as it existed at the $aw 
of death and not as it might change with subsequent ev^pl^ 
.^ But I cannot concur in the conclusion that the reiterate 
of the ordinances and laws relating to duties of person 
driving vehicles on the street was prejudicial. Those laws 
and ordinances touched the rights and duties of both && 
ceased and defendant. If this "placed the emphasis upb$9 
certain propositions of law as against others entitled 1*1 
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equal weight" the propositions so emphasized were statutes 
specifying the rights and duties of both parties on the 
street. It was not a case of emphasizing the duties of the 
traction company and playing down the duties of the de-
ceased or playing up his rights in relation to the defendant. 
If reiterated a dozen times it simply stated the statutory 
law governing both parties on the streets. It is not good 
practice to set out the claims of the parties pro haec verba 
as contained in their pleadings instead of condensing them 
in the court's own language, but to do so is not necessarily 
prejudicial. 
Stating to the jury a claim as contained in the pleading 
when there was no evidence to support it is a more serious 
transgression, but in this case I think it could not have been 
prejudicial in view of the fact that the court notified the 
jury that the language of the pleadings was not evidence 
but only the claim as made by the plaintiff. Since there 
was no evidence to substantiate it and no instruction relating 
to it, we must assume that the jury did not consider it as 
evidence and did not take it into consideration. I think 
the judgment should be affirmed.
 % 
I call attention to the implication in the opinion that 
because Section 26, Article VIII of the Constitution requires 
this court to prepare a syllabus of all points adjudicated in 
each case which shall be concurred in by a majority of the 
judges, the syllabus is paramount over the language of the 
prevailing opinion. Where there is an ambiguity in the 
opinion- ths syllabus may be resorted to in clearing it up 
but where the syllabus and context are contradictory, I 
think we must still resort to the language of the opinion 
and not Hie syllabus aa controlling. I .must therefore em-
phatically dissent from portions ot th* opinion as indicated 
in rtxy discussion. 
TtfcDONOUGH, J., being disqualified, did not participate 
herein. 
11 
